Agree, the idea that China will invade Taiwan over 100 miles of open ocean and have only two beaches capable of receiving an invasion force is as stupid as it is laughable. The Washington DC puppeteers desire it so much out of both desperation and near to mid term war profiteering potential.
I suppose that if Taiwan was clever, it could agree to Chinese reunification but only on the condition of there being genuinely free and fair multiparty *all-China* elections. The CCP would never accept this, of course.
IIRC you comment on Hanania's space -- surprised you didn't reference his piece. Do you have any differences from him on this topic that you want to highlight?
My biggest doubt on this analysis is your prediction that the US wouldn't intervene in the event of an attack. I suspect it probably would, at least if we're talking about the next 10-15 years or so, and so long as the US isn't paralyzed by a Constitutional crisis (which is a real contingency that I have to think Beijing is considering exploiting).
I just think there would be a lot of voices in the US -- for starters, practically everyone who has unironically uttered the words "Slava Ukraini" -- calling for war, and the President would most likely feel cornered into it, just as LBJ felt cornered into a Vietnam War that didn't especially interest him. This is just as true of Democrats. A figure like Kamala is likely to overcorrect in response to insinuations that she is weak, the new Neville Chamberlain; that a woman isn't capable of being a strong Commander-in-Chief.
My prediction is that the US will naturally become more isolationist when the Millennials and Zoomers are running this country. I've never heard a young person talk about "countering the threats from China and Russia", except perhaps to imply that a member of the other party, whom they hate for reasons of domestic culture war politics, is a Chinese/Russian agent. But a lot of Boomers and Gen Xers, coming of age during the Cold War, are obsessed with this topic.
As for China itself attacking, your skepticism seems logical to me. But of course, leaders can always do dumb things when they think a window is closing. The Germans in 1914 were afraid of being eclipsed by a Russia whose population had doubled between 1850-1900. If you're taking the long view of East Asian geopolitics, perhaps the most important question is the inverse of this: how will the balance of power be reordered by population *collapse*?
I only skimmed Hanania's piece when it first came out though it probably would've been wise for me to read it. In another piece I recall he was more hesitant about US involvement in a cross-strait war than in the Russo-Ukrainian War due to the legal basis of the One-China Policy, whereas I care less about international law and more about the immediate outcomes at stake
I think US intervention remains a real possibility, but I'm skeptical that it's over 50% especially under a Democrat because it would be breaking with the One-China Policy and would be the first full-scale war between nuclear powers. Nevertheless, domestic politics can shape these situations in unpredictable directions as you point out
I've seen some Pew polls on isolationism, and they're certainly consistent with your suspicions about future generations. The counterargument is that public opinion won't matter a while lot because there are so many concentrated interests that have a stake in an interventionist foreign policy and they're more organized and motivated on it than the general public. I suppose the synthesis could be a US that remains involved in world affairs but is more reluctant to use force in foreign relations
I agree that population collapse will have profound effects, and I remember Foreign Affairs having a piece on this earlier this year. Taiwan is an immigrant country, so they might be able to offset it to some degree, but it'll be more profound elsewhere. Noah Smith analyzed the numbers and suggested that the effects won't really be felt in China until after 2050, but it'll probably hit Japan and Korea before then. I suppose it'll accelerate the race to automate warfare
I think that whether Americans will fight for Taiwan might depend to a huge extent to the degree which they would be willing to tolerate and accept a new US military draft. And this time, drafting women might also be on the table. Would Americans want to personally risk having themselves and/or their sons *and daughters* die or at least get severely injured for Taiwan's sake? It's possible, but it's not guaranteed.
I agree that war is unlikely, and don’t really understand why China is our enemy.
At the same time, it’s obvious that Taiwan is a more credible case than Ukraine. Ukraine is a basket case with a divided population and little history. Taiwan is a successful country for 75 years and an ocean defending it. The case for defending Taiwan is much better.
You don’t mention nukes. The deployment of nukes makes an invasion of Taiwan impossible even if China achieved conventional dominance. The USA had a nuclear reliance strategy during the Cold War (that was the plan if the Warsaw pact tanks broke through the Fulda gap), not sure why that wouldn’t be the case now.
I think some would argue Taiwan has only been a successful country since democratization in 1996, but I agree that a more realist president would see more reason to defend the ROC. However, I suspect a more liberal internationalist president would be more hesitant given the weaker international legal basis. I could also see Beijing trying to cut a deal on trade or some othrr issue with a Trumpian president in exchange for a free hand in Taiwan
On the issue of nukes, I'm inclined towards skepticism on US willingness to credibly threaten to use them. China lacks nuclear parity with the US, but it still has the minimum for a credible strategic deterrent (second-strike, ICBMs) so that there's MAD. Because China cares more about Taiwan than America does, it would probably be willing to escalate further than the US in the event of a war. Hence, I'm skeptical the US could credibly engage in nuclear brinksmanship since the costs of a strategic exchange would be so high and it would be a real possibility
1) "Success" is about GDP and quality of life. Taiwan has been successful basically its entire existence since the civil war, not just since 1996.
By contrast, Ukraine has been a democracy but not successful since 1991.
Honestly, East Asia just isn't very democratic. I do think that democracy is better, but East Asian democracy isn't quite like western democracy (just look at the PAP in Singapore or the LDP in Japan, even Hong Kong didn't have one man one vote).
2) If America nuked the landing fleets in the Straight or god forbid the landing beaches on Taiwan, what could China do in response?
How would that response help them conquer Taiwan?
In the final analysis, if America irradiated the entire island rather then let China have it, what possible response would make logical sense for China? Plan out the escalatory ladder for me.
I just feel like nukes really change the game. It's certainly possible that an American president, at the end of the day we are talking about the will of one man, could decide not to go that route. But why chance it? What does China gain even if things go great?
3) I feel like what China really wants is to win some dick measuring contest in order to justify its own regime (America wants the same thing). I wish we could find a solution that didn't require the end of the world.
With the Soviet Union we could win economically but it's not clear we could mange that with China (unknown).
The United States was able to successfully defend South Korea without using nukes. Had they required nukes to achieve that objective they might have used them.
Everyone prefers to achieve their key objectives with conventional means if they can, but conventional dominance is too expensive sometimes. We always had big deficits in tanks and artillery versus the Warsaw pact and we never bothered to close that gap.
With Ukraine we kind of helped overthrow their government and turned it into a western military base. Yeah that’s not the official line but anyone with some sense can understand why the Russians did what they did, even if you don’t agree. Invading Taiwan would be far less defensible politically and morally.
I disagree strongly on Imperial Japan. They were allowed to conquer Korea and Manchuria with nothing more than some condemnations. They tried to swallow all of China and we were mostly letting them get away with it until they occupied Vietnam and cozied up to the axis. For the “provocation” of not selling them the oil to go rape China with they surprise attacked us.
On the topic of Japan, I was referring mainly to the end of WWI and the West's failure to treat Japan as an equal even though they were an ally of Britain. I see Japan's road to war with America and Britain as analogous to Russia's now, which is to say immoral but rational. Funny enough Korea (and Formosa) was one of the few colonies they were allowed to annex without controversy, whereas their seizure of German colonies in Micronesia were deemed mandates instead since the US and Australia didn't want Japan to have a permanent foothold deep in the Pacific. But I suppose this is a topic for another day; great thoughts, and I'd appreciate if you have any recommended readings on nuclear strategy
1) Gotcha. I was thinking of success in Fukuyama terms although Taiwan was still a developing country until the eighties. They used to ban emigration because they were worried that since they were a poor country, there'd be a brain drain to wealthier countries
The Ukrainian government (even pre-invasion) has been ranked as a hybrid regime by Freedom House and the Economist, so I'm not sure most would consider it a successful democracy
2) If the US nukes the PLAN vessels, I imagine China would step things up by nuking US military targets in the region such as Okinawa or Guam. In that case, the retaliatory strike would be limited to military assets
As far as I know, the Taiwanese don't have a Samson option agreement with America and I don't see why they'd want one given that their terrain is pretty conventionally defensible. So I'm skeptical that America would nuke ROC territory. It be reminiscent of "we destroyed the village to save it" but at the strategic level
Furthermore, the US didn't go nuclear when it fought China in the Korean War, which is before China had a nuclear arsenal, so it seems less likely to do so now when China has a second-strike capability. In general, American leaders seem risk-averse on the nuclear issue as can be seen even in the Russo-Ukrainian War where America's not even directly involved
3) Definitely agree. The Taiwan issue is an open wound for China, so I think the US should avoid pushing it and focus on preserving the status quo as long as possible. The US should probably accept that China will have some role in the regional and international order that will sometimes be at odds with its interests. One of the causes of WWII in Asia and the Pacific was the West's failure to provide Imperial Japan with a legitimate place in the world order
This is a great analysis. I agree, there seems to be no desire for China to start a kinetic war. They have worked way too hard over the last 50 years to build up their economy to go to war with their largest customer.
I suspect China is pushing politically for reunification. From what I hear, that political message was resonating until things went crazy in Hong Kong a few years ago. This set back reunification a few years, but it appears the old plan is still in play. The last ROC elections seemed to be a step forward in that plan. The immediate plan seems to focus on de-escalating hawkish sentiment from the U.S. before moving forward. A war with the U.S. would be so stupid for everyone involved at this time.
Agree, the idea that China will invade Taiwan over 100 miles of open ocean and have only two beaches capable of receiving an invasion force is as stupid as it is laughable. The Washington DC puppeteers desire it so much out of both desperation and near to mid term war profiteering potential.
I suppose that if Taiwan was clever, it could agree to Chinese reunification but only on the condition of there being genuinely free and fair multiparty *all-China* elections. The CCP would never accept this, of course.
IIRC you comment on Hanania's space -- surprised you didn't reference his piece. Do you have any differences from him on this topic that you want to highlight?
My biggest doubt on this analysis is your prediction that the US wouldn't intervene in the event of an attack. I suspect it probably would, at least if we're talking about the next 10-15 years or so, and so long as the US isn't paralyzed by a Constitutional crisis (which is a real contingency that I have to think Beijing is considering exploiting).
I just think there would be a lot of voices in the US -- for starters, practically everyone who has unironically uttered the words "Slava Ukraini" -- calling for war, and the President would most likely feel cornered into it, just as LBJ felt cornered into a Vietnam War that didn't especially interest him. This is just as true of Democrats. A figure like Kamala is likely to overcorrect in response to insinuations that she is weak, the new Neville Chamberlain; that a woman isn't capable of being a strong Commander-in-Chief.
My prediction is that the US will naturally become more isolationist when the Millennials and Zoomers are running this country. I've never heard a young person talk about "countering the threats from China and Russia", except perhaps to imply that a member of the other party, whom they hate for reasons of domestic culture war politics, is a Chinese/Russian agent. But a lot of Boomers and Gen Xers, coming of age during the Cold War, are obsessed with this topic.
As for China itself attacking, your skepticism seems logical to me. But of course, leaders can always do dumb things when they think a window is closing. The Germans in 1914 were afraid of being eclipsed by a Russia whose population had doubled between 1850-1900. If you're taking the long view of East Asian geopolitics, perhaps the most important question is the inverse of this: how will the balance of power be reordered by population *collapse*?
Great comment
I only skimmed Hanania's piece when it first came out though it probably would've been wise for me to read it. In another piece I recall he was more hesitant about US involvement in a cross-strait war than in the Russo-Ukrainian War due to the legal basis of the One-China Policy, whereas I care less about international law and more about the immediate outcomes at stake
I think US intervention remains a real possibility, but I'm skeptical that it's over 50% especially under a Democrat because it would be breaking with the One-China Policy and would be the first full-scale war between nuclear powers. Nevertheless, domestic politics can shape these situations in unpredictable directions as you point out
I've seen some Pew polls on isolationism, and they're certainly consistent with your suspicions about future generations. The counterargument is that public opinion won't matter a while lot because there are so many concentrated interests that have a stake in an interventionist foreign policy and they're more organized and motivated on it than the general public. I suppose the synthesis could be a US that remains involved in world affairs but is more reluctant to use force in foreign relations
I agree that population collapse will have profound effects, and I remember Foreign Affairs having a piece on this earlier this year. Taiwan is an immigrant country, so they might be able to offset it to some degree, but it'll be more profound elsewhere. Noah Smith analyzed the numbers and suggested that the effects won't really be felt in China until after 2050, but it'll probably hit Japan and Korea before then. I suppose it'll accelerate the race to automate warfare
I think that whether Americans will fight for Taiwan might depend to a huge extent to the degree which they would be willing to tolerate and accept a new US military draft. And this time, drafting women might also be on the table. Would Americans want to personally risk having themselves and/or their sons *and daughters* die or at least get severely injured for Taiwan's sake? It's possible, but it's not guaranteed.
I agree that war is unlikely, and don’t really understand why China is our enemy.
At the same time, it’s obvious that Taiwan is a more credible case than Ukraine. Ukraine is a basket case with a divided population and little history. Taiwan is a successful country for 75 years and an ocean defending it. The case for defending Taiwan is much better.
You don’t mention nukes. The deployment of nukes makes an invasion of Taiwan impossible even if China achieved conventional dominance. The USA had a nuclear reliance strategy during the Cold War (that was the plan if the Warsaw pact tanks broke through the Fulda gap), not sure why that wouldn’t be the case now.
Great comment
I think some would argue Taiwan has only been a successful country since democratization in 1996, but I agree that a more realist president would see more reason to defend the ROC. However, I suspect a more liberal internationalist president would be more hesitant given the weaker international legal basis. I could also see Beijing trying to cut a deal on trade or some othrr issue with a Trumpian president in exchange for a free hand in Taiwan
On the issue of nukes, I'm inclined towards skepticism on US willingness to credibly threaten to use them. China lacks nuclear parity with the US, but it still has the minimum for a credible strategic deterrent (second-strike, ICBMs) so that there's MAD. Because China cares more about Taiwan than America does, it would probably be willing to escalate further than the US in the event of a war. Hence, I'm skeptical the US could credibly engage in nuclear brinksmanship since the costs of a strategic exchange would be so high and it would be a real possibility
1) "Success" is about GDP and quality of life. Taiwan has been successful basically its entire existence since the civil war, not just since 1996.
By contrast, Ukraine has been a democracy but not successful since 1991.
Honestly, East Asia just isn't very democratic. I do think that democracy is better, but East Asian democracy isn't quite like western democracy (just look at the PAP in Singapore or the LDP in Japan, even Hong Kong didn't have one man one vote).
2) If America nuked the landing fleets in the Straight or god forbid the landing beaches on Taiwan, what could China do in response?
How would that response help them conquer Taiwan?
In the final analysis, if America irradiated the entire island rather then let China have it, what possible response would make logical sense for China? Plan out the escalatory ladder for me.
I just feel like nukes really change the game. It's certainly possible that an American president, at the end of the day we are talking about the will of one man, could decide not to go that route. But why chance it? What does China gain even if things go great?
3) I feel like what China really wants is to win some dick measuring contest in order to justify its own regime (America wants the same thing). I wish we could find a solution that didn't require the end of the world.
With the Soviet Union we could win economically but it's not clear we could mange that with China (unknown).
The United States was able to successfully defend South Korea without using nukes. Had they required nukes to achieve that objective they might have used them.
Everyone prefers to achieve their key objectives with conventional means if they can, but conventional dominance is too expensive sometimes. We always had big deficits in tanks and artillery versus the Warsaw pact and we never bothered to close that gap.
With Ukraine we kind of helped overthrow their government and turned it into a western military base. Yeah that’s not the official line but anyone with some sense can understand why the Russians did what they did, even if you don’t agree. Invading Taiwan would be far less defensible politically and morally.
I disagree strongly on Imperial Japan. They were allowed to conquer Korea and Manchuria with nothing more than some condemnations. They tried to swallow all of China and we were mostly letting them get away with it until they occupied Vietnam and cozied up to the axis. For the “provocation” of not selling them the oil to go rape China with they surprise attacked us.
On the topic of Japan, I was referring mainly to the end of WWI and the West's failure to treat Japan as an equal even though they were an ally of Britain. I see Japan's road to war with America and Britain as analogous to Russia's now, which is to say immoral but rational. Funny enough Korea (and Formosa) was one of the few colonies they were allowed to annex without controversy, whereas their seizure of German colonies in Micronesia were deemed mandates instead since the US and Australia didn't want Japan to have a permanent foothold deep in the Pacific. But I suppose this is a topic for another day; great thoughts, and I'd appreciate if you have any recommended readings on nuclear strategy
Ty for your response
1) Gotcha. I was thinking of success in Fukuyama terms although Taiwan was still a developing country until the eighties. They used to ban emigration because they were worried that since they were a poor country, there'd be a brain drain to wealthier countries
The Ukrainian government (even pre-invasion) has been ranked as a hybrid regime by Freedom House and the Economist, so I'm not sure most would consider it a successful democracy
2) If the US nukes the PLAN vessels, I imagine China would step things up by nuking US military targets in the region such as Okinawa or Guam. In that case, the retaliatory strike would be limited to military assets
As far as I know, the Taiwanese don't have a Samson option agreement with America and I don't see why they'd want one given that their terrain is pretty conventionally defensible. So I'm skeptical that America would nuke ROC territory. It be reminiscent of "we destroyed the village to save it" but at the strategic level
Furthermore, the US didn't go nuclear when it fought China in the Korean War, which is before China had a nuclear arsenal, so it seems less likely to do so now when China has a second-strike capability. In general, American leaders seem risk-averse on the nuclear issue as can be seen even in the Russo-Ukrainian War where America's not even directly involved
3) Definitely agree. The Taiwan issue is an open wound for China, so I think the US should avoid pushing it and focus on preserving the status quo as long as possible. The US should probably accept that China will have some role in the regional and international order that will sometimes be at odds with its interests. One of the causes of WWII in Asia and the Pacific was the West's failure to provide Imperial Japan with a legitimate place in the world order
This is a great analysis. I agree, there seems to be no desire for China to start a kinetic war. They have worked way too hard over the last 50 years to build up their economy to go to war with their largest customer.
I suspect China is pushing politically for reunification. From what I hear, that political message was resonating until things went crazy in Hong Kong a few years ago. This set back reunification a few years, but it appears the old plan is still in play. The last ROC elections seemed to be a step forward in that plan. The immediate plan seems to focus on de-escalating hawkish sentiment from the U.S. before moving forward. A war with the U.S. would be so stupid for everyone involved at this time.